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NONPAREIL AMONG JUDGES
HENRY S. MANLEY
Death and retirement for the age limit are the common occasions for
praising judicial service. The subject of this short biography has not
died or retired, but he has served so long and importantly that recog-
nition and appraisal seem overdue. It is believed no other figure in
Anglo-American jurisprudence has been a judge so long, upon so many
courts, or has been trusted by his judicial brethren to announce their
decisions upon such a variety of important issues.
Little is known about Judge Per Curiam's early professional labors
or his private life during the long years of his fame. It can be said of
him peculiarly that his work has been his whole life. He has revealed
his mind and personality to us through his opinions, and otherwise he
has been remarkably self-effacing. As to his family, it is known only
that he bears some undefined relationship to Anonymous, the prolific
author. There is no record of his training in the law, or service at the
bar, or sitting alone in the lower courts.
It is believed that he served on the English appellate courts even
before the American Revolution, and is part of the American heritage
from English law. The earlier cases in the first report by Dallas show
him rendering decisions in the Pennsylvania courts as early as 1760.
Under Chief Justice Marshall he suffered an eclipse, and there was
reason to believe that the opinions in McCullock v. Maryland' and other
cases which Marshall announced without noticing any dissent were
actually non-unanimous. This caused President Jefferson to complain
about Marshall's "habit of caucusing opinions," and for many years
it was an article of the Jeffersonian creed that each justice should de-
liver a separate opinion on every case before the Court.2 This ideal
very nearly has been realized in the Supreme Court of the United States
in recent years.
The last preceding remarks may appear to be a digression from Judge
Per Curiam, but really they introduce some topics particularly related
to his special genius. It is common error to say of his opinions that they
are rendered "in a case in which the judges are all of one mind, and which
is so clear that it is not considered necessary to elaborate it by an ex-
tended discussion."' It is this misunderstanding which has sometimes
14 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
22 WARREN, THE SuPaRD COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 113-115 (1922).
321 C. J. S. 401; Clark v. Western Assurance Co., 146 Pa. 561, 23 Aft. 248 (1892);
Dowling v. Salliotte, 83 Mich. 131, 47 N. W. 225 (1890).
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caused a judge dissenting from his brethren to appear resentful that
Judge Per Curiam was the majority spokesman.4
True it is, that conciseness and conciliation are characteristic features
of Judge Per Curiam's opinions, and his services often are employed
when those relatively humble demands are all that are made upon him.
Particularly when directing a reversal and proceedings below, which may
bring the case back to the appellate court, it sometimes is desirable to
avoid extensive exposition associated with the name or names of particu-
lar judges. It would be a great underestimate of the complexity and ver-
satility of Judge Per Curiam's judicial service to suppose that such
cases are the measure of his capacity. More striking although less fre-
quent and less known is his service in cases which for one reason or an-
other have involved long debates in the consultation room, or would in-
volve such debates except for his tactful intervention.
As example of the last sort is State ex rel. Frazier v. Seibel.5 A few
days before election Judge Per Curiam decided who should be on the
ballot, and all would have been well had his brethren left the matter
there. Instead, after election they attempted to state their reasons, which
required three separate opinions, of which one was written by two dis-
senters. Defensively, the majority opinion said: "If fresh justice is
sweetest, as Lord Bacon says it is, that per curiam filled the bill."6
Election cases, involving important voting groups or powerful politi-
cal figures, not infrequently require the services of Judge Per Curiam,
and in these he performs an important service. Other judges are subject
to criticism in such matters, whether their votes are for or against the
forces that helped put them on the bench or may be needed to retain them
there. For somewhat similar reasons issues involving unions or veter-
ans or'other significant groups of citizens may be dealt with in a per
curiam opinion. There may be a division within the court having a pat-
tern or appearance of a pattern that would prompt undesirable gossip.
Concealing the mere fact of division and thus giving an appearance of
certitude may be a matter of agreement among judges who are not
agreed on the decision. In such classes of cases, if his judicial brethren
shrink at all from giving an opinion specific authorship, Judge Per
Curiam courageously lends the weight of his reputation to the result.
These are not the common instances of his service, but neither are they
so uncommon that they can pass unnoticed without injustice to him.
The admission must be made that some of the occasions for his opinions
have not been altogether helpful to Judge Per Curiam's reputation. He
4See, for an instance, Minor v. Fike, 77 Kan. 806, 93 Pac. 264 (1907).
5262 Mo. 220, 171 S. W. 69 (1914).
Old. at 222, 171 S. W. at 69 (1914).
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has been drafted for too many hard cases. It has even been thought
necessary, in some jurisdictions, to affirm that his opinions have the usual
authority as precedents. A judge of the New York Court of Appeals
recently has said that "a per curiam opinion is one where we agree to
pool our weaknesses." This is, of course, merely the absence of defen-
siveness which is the final proof of acceptance. The high standing which
Judge Per Curiam enjoys among his brethren in the Court of Appeals
can be seen in its reports.
In the back of each volume of New York reports commencing with
volume 147 and prior to volume 289 the State Reporter put a "Tabular
List of Opinions," from which one could readily see how many opinions
were written by each judge and on what topics. In volume 147 Judge
Per Curiam had one opinion and his seven brethren had 84; in volume
288 he had 18 and the other judges 63. In volume 289 is only the note:
"Due to war restrictions on the use of paper the Tabular List of
Opinions usually included in the New York Reports is omitted from
this volume."
In all subsequent volumes, of which 296 is the most recent to appear
in bound form, the Tabular List is lacking. Anybody curious enough
about the matter to tabulate the eight volumes will find that Judge Per
Curiam wrote the opinions in about a fifth of the cases,7 excepting the
memorandum decisions, which are wholly his.
It does not appear that Judge Per Curiam ever wrote a dissenting
opinion for the Court of Appeals, but he sometimes has persuaded the
Court by a very narrow margin.8 Dissents by one judge, or one or more
judges not participating, are relatively common features of cases de-
cided by Judge Per Curiam. Considerably more than half of his cases
are reversals or modifications.9
It is the more remarkable that an extensive use of per curiam opinions
7The cases decided upon per curiam opinions commence at the following page numbers: 289
N. Y. 54, 66, 69, 70, 72, 98, 100, 101, 104, 108, 145, 171, 244, 310, 323, 344, 348, 350, 352,
353, 357, 407, 410, 417, 419, 509; 290 N. Y. 11, 70, 117, 181, 186, 188, 310, 325, 477,
518, 525, 537; 291 N. Y. 65, 75, 77, 81, 98, 109, 179, 224, 241, 245; 292 N. Y. 50, 109,
111, 115, 116, 127, 154, 201, 204, 230, 235, 468, 498; 293 N. Y. 16, 32, 36, 39, 82, 217,
218, 229, 233, 440, 467, 555, 649; 294 N. Y. 5, 6, 22, 31, 58, 204, 263, 292, 497, 500,
522, 554, 557, 583, 584, 610, 628, 632; 295 N. Y. 97, 320, 354, 357, 390, 395, 539, 541,
544, 545; 296 N. Y. 10, 15, 16, 62, 65, 85, 93, 151, 161, 165, 231, 239, 242, 244, 305, 409.
In the eight volumes, 117 opinions are per curiam out of a total of 601 cases preceding the
memorandum decisions.8For examples, see People v. Greenburg,. 289 N. Y. 72, 43 N. E. 2d 816 (1942); People
v. Barone, 289 N. Y. 100, 43 N. E. 2d 829 (1942); and Matter of Brokaw, 293 N. Y. 555,
59 N. E. 2d 243 (1944), each a four to three decision. Two judges dissented from per
curiam decisions in Matter of McCall, 289 N. Y. 104, 44 N. E. 2d 385 (1942); People v.
Regan, 292 N. Y. 109, 54 N. E. 2d 32 (1944); Matter of Woolard, 295 N. V. 390, 68
N. E. 2d 181 (1946) ; and People ex reL. Rao v. Adams, 296 N. Y. 231, 72 N. E. 2d 170 (1947).9 1n the last eight volumes (289-296 N. Y.), 67 of the 117 per curiam cases were re-
versals or modifications.
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has grown up in New York appellate courts, because they adhere to
the practice of assigning each case to a particular judge by rotation upon
the argument. Their practice in this respect is in contrast with that of
the Supreme Court of the United States, where the assignment is not
made until after consultation and the decision has been determined. The
arguments in favor of the respective methods were presented about 1928
by two outstandingly able commentators.'0
Mr. Hughes, in his Columbia lectures in 1928, said that the method
of assignment in the Supreme Court of the United States worked well:
"I regard it as far better than the method of some Courts of
assigning cases in rotation so that the judges know when the case
is argued, unless there is some division making a different assign-
ment necessary, who is going to write the opinion. In the Supreme
Court every judge comes to the conference to express his views and
to vote, not knowing but that he may have the responsibility of
writing the opinion which will accord with the vote. He is thus keenly
aware of his responsibility in voting. It is not the practice of the
Supreme Court to postpone voting until an opinion has been brought
in by one of the judges which may be plausible enough to win the
adherence of another judge who has not studied the case care-
fully.""1
Strong words, and somewhat more persuasive than the opposed argu-
ment of Mr. Hiscock, then recently retired from the Chief Judgeship
of the Court of Appeals. He said that after long experience he felt very
strongly that assignment of cases by rotation was a better method than
that of assignment by the Chief Judge. The first reason he gave was
that some cases were alive with interest and others were a drudgery,
and a Chief Judge would not be able to assign them without some asso-
ciate feeling disappointed. His second reason was that assignment by
rotation avoided specialization of certain judges in particular classes of
cases, in which event:
"... it would be equally natural for other judges, unconsciously,
to think they might safely rely on the judgment of one who had
become a specialist in that class of cases and thus fail to exercise
that independent judgment which litigants are entitled to expect
from every member of an appellate court.' 2
Ex-judge Hiscock, even more clearly than Ex-judge Hughes, premised
his case on recognitions of judicial fallibility. This is an additional reason
why non-members of the judicial guild well may be wary of joining battle
on the Court of Appeals side.
1OHuGHES, TE SuPR . COURT oF T= UNITED STATES 57-65 (1928); Hiscock, The
Court of Appeals of New York: Some Features of its Organization and Work, 14 COR-
N=ru L. Q. 131, 138-140 (1929).
1 1HUGHES. TEE SuPREmE COURT Or TEE UNITED STATES 59 (1928).
12 Hiscock, The Court of Appeals of New York: Some Features of its Organization and
Work, 14 Comuw!u L. Q. 131, 138 (1929).
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Each commentator noted, with differing judgments, a greater tendency
towards judicial participation in the oral argument of cases in the
Supreme Court, and a greater tendency to let the attorneys argue un-
disturbed in the Court of Appeals. Neither suggested that this was re-
lated to the method of assignment, which in the Supreme Court encour-
ages the justices to look at the briefs in advance of the argument, but
such may be the fact. It has even seemed that the method of the New
York appellate courts has sometimes tended towards only one member
of the bench being attentive at all to oral argument. This observation is
not so pointed in recent years as it was some years ago.
In 1927, when the Workmen's Compensation Law was relatively new,
an insurance carrier succeeded in a remarkable contention before the
Appellate Division, Third Department, Justice Hinman dissenting. 3
An award had been made for the death of a truckman. He was accus-
tomed to doze while his wagon was on the ferry from New York City
to Jersey City, and while so dozing he was killed. It was contended, and
the Appellate Division was persuaded, that the claim should be dismissed,
because the driver's sleep was a temporary vacation from his employ-
ment. Arguing for the claimant in the Court of Appeals the venerable
and sententious E. C. Aiken stated the facts and the decision below and
paused for a thoughtful space. Then he said:
"Sometimes when I have argued cases in the Third Department
I have observed some of the justices to have their eyes closed. I
don't know whether they were asleep, but if they were asleep I
wouldn't argue that they necessarily were taking vacations from
their judicial employments. Now coming to this Court--"
"You needn't go any further with that line of argument," said Chief
Judge Cardozo, his eyes twinkling. "This Court has your point." Mr.
Aiken suspended argument, his case won.
Perhaps we are strayed a long way from our appreciation of Judge
Per Curiam, and perhaps not. The suggestion may be made that it is
time to re-examine the occasions for his usefulness, and some of the pro-
cedures with which he is associated. Perhaps the danger of leaning upon
specialists, which Judge Hiscock feared, sometimes is present with less
justification. If it is true that judges might resent the assignment of
some classes of cases because they are a drudgery, the same judges will
not be critical of the reasoning of others, unhappily burdened with those
cases by the process of rotation. Perhaps the better method would be
no allocation of personal responsibility before consultation, less interval
between argument and consultation, and more personal responsibility
for the decisions announced.
13 Matter of Corrina v. De Barbied, 221 App. Div. 631, 225 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1927),
rev'd, 247 N. Y. 357, 160 N. E. 397 (1928).
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